Why
did the Turkish Republic agree to honour the Ottoman foreign debt?
One of the main financial problems that Turkey faced, during
it its founding years, was the repayment of the external debt inherited from
the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans had taken their first external loan in 1854,
during the Crimean War, to help finance the military. This loan was followed by
subsequent foreign loans, the unproductive use of which resulted in an
increasing debt burden. By 1876 the Ottoman state was unable to service
the debt and defaulted, formally declaring bankruptcy in 1879. Sultan Abdulhamit
signed the Decree of Muharrem in1881,
agreeing to make the external debt the first charge on state revenues, and to
hand over the administration of a sizeable proportion of these revenues to the
Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA), an organisation run by a council comprised
of members from creditor countries.
The Ottoman foreign debt stood at 161 million Turkish gold
liras[1] on
the eve of the First World War, when the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP -
Young Turks) government declared a moratorium on all external debt payments,
except for payments on loans taken out in Germany. In the period leading to
1914 the servicing of this debt had taken up a significant chunk of the
revenues of the empire[2] –
hence it was not a minor financial issue for the new Turkish state, emerging
from the devastations of the War and the ensuing National Struggle (1919-22)
led by Mustafa Kemal. In fact the debt issue would prove to be the main stumbling
block at the Lausanne Peace Conference, as Inonu, the lead Turkish delegate
noted:
‘We concluded all the land questions but could
not resolve the financial and economic ones… I insisted absolutely on the
financial questions, as this was imperative. In truth, the land questions for
us were secondary[3].
We could not however admit to be treated as a middle-age country financially.’[4]
There were a number of options open to the Grand National
Assembly (GNA) of Turkey, which was founded in Ankara immediately after the
Istanbul parliament had been disbanded, on how to deal with the external debt.
The First World War had resulted in the demise of two other multi-ethnic
empires, the Russian and Austro-Hungarian, in addition to the Ottoman. The
Bolsheviks repudiated all the Tsarist foreign debts early in 1918. At the other
extreme, the successor states from the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Hapsburg
Monarchy (except Romania), ‘quickly accepted their liability for debts and
resumed service on it to regain access to international financial markets.’[5] In
the case of Turkey, the Ottoman state debts were accepted in principle, yet because
financial negotiations lasted until 1928, five years after the signing of the
Lausanne Peace Treaty, Turkey’s ability to borrow internationally did not
become possible before 1930.
Moore and Kaluzny list a number of options open to a
government which has inherited the debts of a previous government, such as: ‘repaying the debts, defaulting on them,
making partial payments, completely repudiating the loans or renegotiating for
better terms (such as at a lower interest rate, an extension of the loan, or a
write down of the principal outstanding)’[6]. As
the Soviets had been the principal supporter of the National Struggle, the
precedent they had set in refusing to accept the debt of a previous imperial
regime could have been considered as an option by the GNA. But the option to
repudiate the debt was never considered by the Kemalist leadership: the degree
of break this would entail with international finance had never been an element
of their political programme.
Comparing it with the Russian revolution, Carr says about
the Turkish struggle: ‘The Kemalist revolution was, however, essentially a
national, not a social, revolution.’ [7] When
the Soviet Government annulled all internal and external debts, the Bolsheviks
were expecting the socialist revolution to extend to Europe -to Germany and
beyond. Mustafa Kemal and the GNA, on
the other hand, had no political perspectives that went beyond the
establishment of their own nation state. Moore and Kaluzny suggest that ‘At the time of
the Russian debt repudiation the Bolshevik leaders, in particular Lenin, were
unsure as to how long the revolution would last.’[8] In
other words, as the Bolshevik’s had a low regime duration expectation, ‘the benefit
of repudiating their debts relative to the cost of exclusion from capital
markets in the future (when they may not have still been in power) was high.’ [9] It is debatable if behind the Bolshevik’s
decision to repudiate all foreign loans in February 1918 lay the calculated
risk of the failure of the revolution, or whether it was due to their initially
high expectation that the revolution would spread and make all imperial debts a
matter of the past. It is unlikely that
they would have come to an accommodation with their archenemies, by repaying
Tsar’s debt to them, as long as the possibility of revolution in Europe existed.
It was only when it became apparent that the revolution had been contained, that
is after the defeat of the German uprising in 1918 followed by the defeat of
the Red Army in Poland (1919-21), that they had to reconsider their position, and
soon after signed a Trade Agreement with Britain, on March 16,1921.
By comparison with Lenin and the Bolshevik leaders, who feared
that their revolution would not survive without its spread into Europe, Mustafa
Kemal and the GNA had no such worries.
The GNA included the experienced military commanders and civil
administrators of the empire. They were hardened in battle, self-confident and
certain of their place in a world composed of sovereign nations. This was the
‘Age of Nationalism’ and they were sure that Turkish nationalism had come of
age. Their main concern was to consolidate their forces in territories
remaining from the Ottoman Empire and establish control over unruly civil and
political movements. Even before Lausanne, the GNA had reached bilateral agreements
with the French and Italians who withdrew from Anatolia, leaving significant
military equipment behind to the nationalist forces. Following the defeat of
the Greek armies, and their expulsion from Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal’s hands were
free to move ahead with the creation of the Turkish Republic. The Kemalist
leadership of the GNA had no axe to grind with imperialism, or world capitalism,
as long as they were allowed to build their own sovereign state.
There were three main policy platforms that defined the objectives
of the National Struggle, and by implication that of nation creation. The first
one was the National Pact (Misaki-i Milli Beyannamesi). The second was the GNA
brief prepared for the Lausanne Peace Conference. The third was the Lausanne
Peace Treaty, which confirmed the shape the Turkish republic would take. In
between the declaration of the National Pact and Lausanne took place the Treaty
of Sèvres (10 August 1920), which aimed to diminish Turkey territorially to
that of a central Anatolian state.
The National Pact was declared on the 2nd March
1920 by the Istanbul Assembly (Meclis-i Mebusan). It was presented as a peace programme to the
Entente Powers, who saw in the Pact only a direct challenge to their rule. Following
the declaration of the National Pact they formally occupied Istanbul and raided
the Assembly, after which the Sultan disbanded the Assembly. The Pact’s first three clauses defined the
boundaries of the Ottoman Empire as the frontiers drawn at the Mudanya
Armistice (30 October 1918), and proposed plebiscites to take place in contested
areas. The fourth referred to the
security of the Sultanate and Caliphate, and the fifth to the rights of
minorities. The sixth clause of the Pact was to do with financial issues:
Article 6 of the National Pact,
‘
To pursue our national and economic development, and to conduct our state
business with modern methods we require, as do all other states, complete
independence and freedom. This is a precondition of our life and
existence. Thus, we are opposed to restrictions
inimical to our development in political, judicial, financial and other
matters. The conditions of settlement of our confirmed state debts shall
likewise not be contrary to this principle’[10]
There is a degree of elasticity on the question of owning to
the state debt, as the repayment of the debt, an unproductive budget
expenditure, would naturally have a detrimental effect on the economic
development of the republic. It has been argued that as a result of agreeing to
the repayment of the debt at Lausanne this article of the National Pact was
violated[11].
However, it can also be reasoned that agreeing to the repayment of the loan,
and the possibility of access to foreign loans in the future (although as
discussed below this became possible much later than anticipated) could be a
factor to assist the future development of the republic.
The National Pact was never formally adopted by the GNA, but
Mustafa Kemal, and other leaders of the National Struggle, frequently referred
it to, not always favourably. Nationalist historians generally consider it to
be the defining document of the aims of the National Struggle. On the eve of
the Lausanne Peace Conference, however, it was felt that it needed firming up,
and the Turkish delegates going to Lausanne were provided by the Council of
Ministers with a brief to complement the National Pact. I’ll refer to this
document as the GNA Brief.
In the GNA Brief there were two clauses referring to fiscal
matters:
‘8. Capitulations[12]:
Cannot be accepted, if necessary to cease negotiations, the necessary will be
done.
10.
Ottoman Debts: Will be apportioned among the countries that have broken away
from us, reparations received from Greece will be counted against the debt, if
not it will be postponed for 20 years. The Ottoman Public Debt Administration
(Duyunu-u Umumiye Idaresi) will be abolished, if difficulties arise consult
with Ankara.’[13]
The
CUP government had already, after its entry into the war, abrogated the capitulations
and made foreign companies and citizens accountable to Ottoman laws. At
Lausanne the Entente powers did not demand to re-establish the capitulations,
confirming that:
Article 28: Each of the High Contracting Parties hereby accepts, in so
far as it is concerned, the complete abolition of the Capitulations in Turkey
in every respect.[14].
This
was an important gain for Turkey, especially compared with Sevres, which had
stipulated that capitulations would be re-established and extended to include
all the Entente countries. Hur, argues
that this was because commercial capitulations were no longer advantageous to
imperialist countries as imperialism by that time had developed modern means for
exploiting countries[15]. Possibly so, but less than three years
separate Sevres from Lausanne, and ceteris
paribus Britain would have been happy to continue
with the concessions provided by the capitulations, as demonstrated by their
inclusion in the Sevres treaty.
Hur,
claims that legal capitulations were not abolished at Lausanne[16]. This
is not accurate. Inonu expands on this question in his memoirs, where he says
that the Entente powers did not insist to maintain financial capitulations, but
that especially Britain was adamant in relation to legal capitulations, and
insisted they were kept. Inonu describes how he finally agreed to a group of five
jurists to review the progress of the Turkish legal system as a face-saving
measure for Britain, but that the jurists were never allowed to interfere with
the changes made to the Turkish legal system.[17] The
Lausanne Treaty articles confirm that the legal capitulations were abolished
and that conditions of reciprocity and accordance with international law would
be observed on all judicial matters. For example, in addition to Article 28
quoted above, it stated under Chapter II – Jurisdiction that:
‘14. In Turkey, the nationals of other contracting powers and
reciprocally Turkish nationals in the territories of the said Powers, will have
free access to the courts of the country, and may sue and be sued in the same
conditions in all respects as nationals of the country, subject to provisions
of article 18. [article 18 refers to legal costs –DN]
15. Subject to the provisions of article 16, all questions of jurisdiction
shall, as between Turkey and other contracting powers, be decided in accordance
with the principles of international law. [article 16 refers to matters of
personal status –DN]’ [18]
The
free-trade treaties of the Ottoman Empire were discontinued. But it was agreed
that the existing structure of low tariff rates would remain for a period of
five years. This looks like a penalty imposed on Turkey in exchange of
abolishing the capitulations and trade treaties.
The
question of war reparations had in the main already been resolved at Sevres.
‘War Reparations. All claims
against the Turkish Government for reparations are waived by Allied powers’ and
this was candidly justified ‘as Turkey will be left only a portion of the
revenue of the Ottoman Empire’. [19]
This
is confirmed at Lausanne, this time without any reference to the diminished resources
of Turkey:
Article 58. Turkey, on the one hand, and the
other Contracting Powers (except Greece) on the other hand, reciprocally
renounce all pecuniary claims for the loss and damage suffered respectively by
Turkey and the said Powers and by their nationals (including juridical persons)
between the 1st August, 1914, and the coming into force of the present Treaty,
as the result of acts of war or measures of requisition, sequestration,
disposal or confiscation
As
for Greece, Turkey’s request for war reparations from Greece was granted. However,
as war reparations from Greece were not forthcoming due to the dire state Greek
finances[20],
instead Greece returned to Turkey Karaagac, a district of Edirne
(Adrianopolis).
On
the Ottoman Public Debt (OPD) there was already an agreement on principle at Sevres.
This met the demands of both the National Pact and the GNA Brief, i.e., that the
Ottoman debt should be equitably divided among successor states. The relevant
clause at Sevres stated:
‘The Ottoman Public debt shall be deemed to consist of
the Debt heretofoe governed by the Decree of Muharrem. ’ Loans acquired before 1 Nov 1914 will be taken into
account in the distribution of the OPD between Turkey, the sates of the Balkan Peninsula
and the new states set up in Asia.’[21]
The
Ottoman Public Debt article at Lausanne confirms the same policy:
Article 46. The Ottoman
Public Debt, shall be distributed under the conditions laid down in the present
Section between Turkey, the States in favour of which territory has been
detached from the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan wars of 1912-13, the States
to which the islands referred to in Articles 12 and 15 of the present Treaty and the
territory referred to in the last paragraph of the present Article have been
attributed, and the States newly created in territories in Asia which are
detached from the Ottoman Empire under the present Treaty. All the above States
shall also participate, under the conditions laid down in the present Section,
in the annual charges for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt from the dates
referred to in Article 53.
Overall, the goals set by the National Pact and the GNA
Brief were met with the Lausanne Treaty. Many of the onerous terms of the
Treaty of Sevres, signed on the 10th August 1920, but never confirmed
by the Ottomans, were abandoned. The Capitulations were abolished. The treaty settled the boundaries of Turkey,
including the restoration of eastern Thrace so that Turkey’s border in Europe
was restored to what it had been in 1914. Eastern borders were left for settlement
later (in the case of Mosul this was ceded to Iraq). Also, significantly, the Armenian and Kurdish
right of self-determination included in the Sevres Treaty did not get a hearing
at Lausanne.
By the time the Lausanne Treaty was signed the demands of
the National Pact, had been overtaken by events on a key aspect. The National
Pact had not aimed the creation of a republic, only the defence of the Ottoman
Sultanate and the Islamic Caliphate[22].
At both of the Congresses of Erzurum and Sivas the call to arms to the
population was to free the Sultan and Caliphate from foreign oppression. As the
National Struggle developed, however, the Sultanate was abolished on the 2nd
November 1922, a turn of events that would inexorably lead towards a republic. The
political link with the ancien régime was conclusively broken. The National Pact had
been overtaken by historical developments. The Istanbul government of the
Ottoman Empire and the Sultan were by 1923 viewed as traitors and enemies of
Turkey. These changed political and
historical circumstances could have been considered by the GNA as sufficient
reasons to review the commitment of the National Pact on the debt the old
regime, and to refuse paying it.
It is not so much that, the National Pact clause on the acceptance
in principle of the Ottoman debt was considered binding by the GNA, more that there
was a strong desire to move ahead and establish a relationship of equals with
Western countries. Modernisation for the
Young Turk movement, and the Kemalists that followed, was synonymous with
Westernisation –as a result there was a strong impulse in the cadre of the National
Struggle to establish durable political and commercial links with the West. There
was moreover a pressing issue that needed addressing.
The GNA was the governing body of a new state, yet it had to
rely to a very large extent on the existing Ottoman state apparatus, the army
and the Ottoman civil administration. It may have seemed anachronistic for the
GNA, but it also had to rely on the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA).
The OPDA had become the main tax collection body of the empire: it was a large
and well-established administration, and it was indispensible to Ankara, as it did
not have the means to immediately replace it.
The OPDA was formed in 1891, in the wake of the Ottoman
state defaulting on its foreign loans in 1876 and declaring bankruptcy in 1879.
It was entrusted with the management of the debt. The OPDA had Britain and
France in its executive as its two principal creditor countries, and the
Ottomans were given observer status only. ‘For the next 30 years the OPDA was
the most powerful economic agency in the Empire. In 1914 it had 700 offices and
9,000 employees. It virtually controlled central government finance, exerted
great influence over railway concessions and other development projects, and
received diplomatic support from the major powers and the assistance from the
principal foreign banks.’[23]
The extent of the external grip on the Ottoman Empire led
Lord Derby to observe: ‘the daily surveillance of which Turkey is the object in
her domestic affairs has reduced her sovereign authority to practically zero’. [24]
This was clearly a low point in the five-century history of the Ottomans, but
it was clear to Abdulhamit that a settlement was necessary to resume borrowing and
continue with the programme of modernizing the Empire’s infrastructure and its
army. The ability to have access to foreign finance was also going to be
foremost in the minds of the Turkish delegates at Lausanne, just as it was in
Abdulhamit’s. The second Turkish delegate at Lausanne, Dr Riza Nur, describes
this mind-set in his memoirs. “A state cannot avoid having debts. Especially
we, impoverished Turkey, cannot develop without European capital.” [25]
The OPDA had been a double-edged sword for the Ottomans. It
reduced the Ottomans ability to manage their own affairs and finances, it ceded
the control over tariff rates on imports and exports, and control over a
significant proportion of its revenue was lost.
The OPDA was instrumental in streamlining the transfer of revenues from
Ottoman lands to core countries of the West, and as such its operation looked
very much as a confirmation of the theory of imperialism defended by Lenin and
socialists at the time, which identified imperialism as the capital flow from
core capitalist countries to backward ones, and the flow of surplus value from
the periphery to the core. With the OPDA, and the economic concessions granted
to Western countries through the Capitulations, the Ottoman Empire had become,
at the very least in the economic sense, effectively a ‘colonial’ country.
On the other hand, the OPDA operated as an efficient
debt-collecting agency, repaying creditors as per the Decree of Muharrem. It was a trusted international
financial institution, so that the Ottoman government credit status improved to
the extent that new loans could be negotiated. This aspect of the OPDA leads Birdal, who
studied the operation of the OPDA in some detail, to conclude that ‘the OPDA
initiated several measures including administrative reforms and technology transfers
that not only facilitated growth in the sectors under its responsibility, but
also generated positive externalities for other sectors. The administrative
reform initiated by the OPDA also set examples for the Ottoman state.’ [26] While the OPDA was the instrument of Western
capitalism to penetrate the Ottoman Empire and safeguard their investments,
Birdal points also to ‘the role of the OPDA in the modernization of the Turkish
state’.[27]
The dual role of the OPDA was not overlooked by the GNA.
Following the occupation of Istanbul in 16 March 1920 all
income of the OPDA, as well as Ottoman Banks and the tobacco Regie Company was
seized by the GNA. Over half of the revenue from Anatolia used to be collected
by the OPDA. There was no possibility in the short term for the GNA to directly
collect these taxes, which would have required the creation of new tax offices,
the training of staff, etc. Under these difficult circumstances Hakki Behic,
the first Finance Minister of the Assembly, called the OPDA representative Ali
Cevat to his office and proposed the following:
‘We are at war. You collect the
taxes and give them to us. But take out your expenses. When we have peace we will
settle.’ [28]
Apparently this arrangement suited the OPDA, which now had a
verbal confirmation that the foreign lenders, which they represented, would be
paid after the end of hostilities. The
8,000 staff that worked in the Anatolian offices of the OPDA was as a result
guaranteed their jobs. The first budget of the GDA in 1920 acknowledged this
commitment by assigning 12.1% of the budget to the OPDA, a budget outflow that was
second only to the Ministry of Defence expenditure.[29] Yilmaz suggests that this demonstrated the
good intentions of the GNA. It also demonstrated, I would add, a predisposition
of the GNA to come to an agreement with the OPDA. Notably, the new republic would also inherit ‘most
of the institutions created during the OPDA era. For instance TEKEL (the state
monopoly on salt, tobacco and spirits), the largest state enterprise of the
Turkish Republic, was established on these foundations.‘[30]
The red line behind which the GNA would not retreat was not
the Ottoman debt issue, but their commitment to build a sovereign nation state
on the remains the empire. Land issues were secondary as Inonu candidly pointed
out. The Capitulations were abolished at Lausanne; this was a key non-negotiable
demand deemed to be a pre-requisite of sovereignty. Repayment of the Ottoman
debt was never challenged in principle, although on this issue the devil lay in
the detail. It proved quite difficult and complex to determine the amount of
debt the republic would have to pay, and how it would pay it given its meagre
resources. This would delay the time by which Turkey could have access to
foreign loans and investments. The payments
themselves would prove taxing for a long period.
At Lausanne, the sharing of the debt among successor states
was agreed on the basis of the ‘proportion of the average annual revenue of the
successor states to the Empire’s average annual revenues for the period between
1910-12.’[31]
What may at first sight appear to be a fair and equitable way of dividing the
debt proved difficult to implement, because of the complexity in calculating
the revenues in a way that was agreeable to all parties, causing the
prolongation of the negotiations until 1928. Another sticky issue was in the
currency with which the debts would be repaid, successor states offering to pay
in paper currencies while the foreign bondholders insisted on gold or foreign
currency.
Final agreement on the debt issue was reached on the 13th
June 1928. According to the agreement, Turkey accepted to repay 62% of the
debts incurred before 1912, and 76% of the debts incurred between 17 October
1912 and 1 November 1914. The other major debtors were Greece with 10.5% of the
pre 17 October 1912 debt, and Syria and Lebanon with 8 % of the pre 17 October
1912 debt and 10.2% of the debts incurred between 17 October 1912 and 1
November 1914[32].
Turkey was accepting to pay 107.5 million of its total debt
of 161.3 million gold lira. [33] The repayment of this sum over 99 years was
accepted by bondholders. The Turkish government paid £1,435,000 for the first
year as an interest-only instalment, but could not continue to repay its annual
obligation due to the onset of the Great Depression. According to Moore and Kaluzny,
Turkey did not default but exercised the right to suspend repayments for 2
years, and pledged as collateral custom duties and consumption taxes from three
districts. In 1930 the Turkish government demanded a renegotiation of the 1928
agreement, and in November of the same year made only a third of the required
payments.[34] A
series of negotiations followed during 1931 and 1932, culminating in an
agreement in Paris in 1933 that reduced the debt to 86 million lira at 7.5% interest,
to be paid over 50 years in French francs. Further negotiations took place in
1936 and 1938, and it took until 1954 for the debt to be repaid, helped by the
French franc loosing value after 1936. [35]
Did agreement to repay the Ottoman debt provide Turkey with
access to international money markets? Only very gradually. The first foreign
loan that Turkey was able to negotiate was in 1930 from a private American
company as capital for the Central Bank of Turkey established that year. Small loans
taken from Britain in 1938 were for the import of machinery from Britain. There
was no significant borrowing in the period leading to World War II, except for
a few arrangements made for military equipment purchases from Britain and the
United States. Only after the war could loans be negotiated for development
projects, the Marshall Aid programme providing by far the largest foreign
currency investments, which Turkey took advantage off after joining NATO in
1952.[36]
How did the Soviet Union, having refuted Tsarist debts, compare
with Turkey in its ability to procure foreign loans? The Soviets first loan was
a 10-year loan for £300 million from the US in 1933. This was the exception, however,
as Russia was excluded from commercial capital markets until the 1970s. During the war, Soviets received significant financial
assistance from Britain and the US, but mainly from the US under the Lend-Lease
Act. The Soviets defaulted payments on most of these loans until 1986 when
Russia settled the claims of the British bondholders, and in 1996 agreed to
take the responsibility for the Tsarist-era debt. It commenced in 1997 payments
to France, completing in November 2000.[37]
Both the Turkish and Russian experience indicate that debts
of previous regimes are eventually paid off, in spite of defaults,
re-negotiation of terms, consolidations and then further consolidations of the
debt over a long period: thirty years in the case Turkey, and nearly eighty
years for Russia. The Soviet Union, by refuting all Tsarist debts, could apply
all its revenues towards the process of industrialisation. If the Soviets had
not been able to progress their industrialisation programme at the pace that
they did, they would most likely have succumbed against Germany in the WW2. The
Turkish economy, on the other hand, seemed to have got the worst of both
worlds.
Turkey had reached agreement on its debt obligations yet it was
unable to obtain significant foreign loans or credits for its modernisation
programme until the 1950s. There were
many other factors that caused the sluggish performance of the Turkish economy
during this period, including the worldwide economic crisis of the 1930s and
the Second World War. Turkeys Real Gross National Product (real GNP) between
the years 1928 to 1950 grew from 20 million to 35 million Turkish liras, while
in the next 22 years, it quadrupled, reaching 170 million Turkish liras. [38] There
was more than one reason for this accelerated growth, including the post-war
boom economy and the more liberal economic regime applied under the Menderes
government. Nevertheless, the influx of foreign capital, and long-term loans
that increased tenfold between 1950 and 1972, was a significant contributory
factor to the growth of this period.
In summary, it was not the prospect of a speedy economic
development or that of becoming a strong military power that was driving the
Kemalists during the transition from Empire to Republic. It was solely the
aspiration to become a sovereign modern nation state, and the conviction that
to achieve this goal political and fiscal matter had to be settled with Britain
and France, while the Soviets were kept at arms length. This was demonstratively achieved when
Turkey joined, in 1952, NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The
commitment to repay the Ottoman debt was only one of the stones that paved the
way on this path.
Dario Navaro
London 17 June 2012.
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[1] Seyfettin Gursel, ‘Dis Borclar’, in Cumhuriyet Donemi Turkiye Ansiklopedisi,
Vol 2 (Istanbul, Iletisim 1983), p 470,, ,
[2] The 1914 budget was 34 million gold Turkish liras, of
which 14 million went to pay the OPDA instalments. (The Turkish gold lira was
more or less equivalent to the Sterling in value) Yilmaz, F, Osmanli
Dis Borclari, (Ottoman Foreign Debts) Berikan Yayinlari, Ankara (2007) p.8,
[3] The proposed
territorial clauses leaving northern Iraq, the Aegean islands and Western
Thrace outside the boundaries of the new state was not received well by the
Grand National Assembly (GNA) in Ankara. Following the impasse on financial
issues tht caused the break-up of the
negotiations in February, the Second Group in the GNA insisted on keeping the
territories defined in the National Pact (Misak-i Milli). Mustafa Kemal
circumvented the objections by reconstituting the assembly in a tightly
controlled new election in 1923. See Hasan Kayali, ‘The struggle for
independence’, Ed. Metin Kunt,and Resat
Kasaba, Cambridge History of Turkey (Cambridge University Press, 2008),
p. 142.
[4] Faruk Yilmaz, Osmanli
Dis Borclari (Ankara, Berikan Yayinlari, 2007), p. 218.
[5] Lyndon Moore and Jakun Kaluzny, ‘Regime change and
debt default: the case of Russia, Austro-Hungary, and the Ottoman empire
following World War One’, Explorations in
Economic History, 42 (2005), p. 256
[7] Edward Hallett Carr, The
Bolshevik Revolution: 1917 - 1923 (New York, Penguin Books, 1984), Vol 3, p
248
[8] Moore ‘Regime change
and debt default: the case of Russia, Austro-Hungary, and the Ottoman empire
following World War One, ’p. 247
[12] Capitulations provided extraterritorial legal and financial
concessions for Western countries and their citizens.
[13] Faruk Yilmaz, Osmanli Dis Borclari (Ankara, Berikan
Yayinlari, 2007), p. 107. Also in Ayse Hur, Oteki Tarih –II, p 251.
[14] Reha Parla,
Lozan and Montro, (Lefkose, Tezel Ofset, 1985), p8. In English see http://www.hri.org/docs/lausanne/part1.html
[16] ‘On Legal
Capitulations there was no success. Any dispute between the Entente powers or
its partners, and the Ottoman Empire, and any of its agencies, will be dealt
based on the concessionary agreements made before 29 October 1914. Ayse Hur, Oteki Tarih Vol II, p. 250
[17] İnönü,
İsmet, Ismet İnönu’nün Hatıraları
(Memoirs of Ismet Inonu) (Ankara, Yenigün Haber Ajansı, 1998),
p.103
[18] Handbook of
Commercial Treaties between Great Britain and Foreign Powers, Third Edition,
‘Convention Between the British Empire, France, Italy, japan, Greece, Roumania
and the Serb-Croat-Slovane State and Turkey, respecting Conditions of Residence
and Business and Jurisdiction – Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923’, His
Majesty’s Stationary Office, London (1924), p. 858-9
[19] The Treaties of
Peace 1919-1923, Vol 2 (New York,
The Carnagie Endowment for International Peace, 1924), p. 864.
[20] Article 47 of the Lausanne Treaty. Greece
recognises her obligation to make reparation for the damage caused in Anatolia
by the acts of the Greek army or administration which were contrary to the laws
of war. On the other hand, Turkey, in consideration of the financial situation
of Greece resulting from the prolongation of the war and from its consequences,
finally renounces all claims for reparation against the Greek Government
[21] The Carnagie Endowment for International Peace 1924, The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol
2. p 864
[22] Article 4 of the National Pact (Misak-i Milli) states:
Istanbul as the centre of the Islamic
Caliphate, the Ottoman Sultanate and government, and the Sea of Marmara, must
be secured against any kind of harm.
346-7
[24] ibid, p. 359.
[25] Riza Nur, Lozan Hatiralari, (Istanbul, Bogazici
Yayinlari,1991), p. 215.
[26] Mahmut Birdal,
The Political Economy of Ottoman Public
Debt: Insolvency and European Financial Control in the Late Nineteenth Century
(London, Taurus Academic Studies, 2010), p. 174
[31] Seyfettin Gursel, Dis Borclar, Cumhuriyet
Donemi Turkiye Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, Iletisim
Yayinlari, 1983), p 470
[32] Apportionment
of the Ottoman Public Debt,
Contributor: Henry Paul Harvey Sir, K. C. M. G.,
London (1925). In Enclosure 4 in No 1, ‘La reparation the Charges annuelles de
la Dette publique ottoman’, p 9
[33] Seyfettin Gursel, Dis Borclar, Cumhuriyet
Donemi Turkiye Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, Iletisim
Yayinlari, 1983), p. 470.
[34] Moore Lyndon , ‘Regime
change and debt default: the case of Russia, Austro-Hungary, and the Ottoman
empire following World War One’, Explorations
in Economic History, 42 (2005), p255
[35] Seyfettin Gursel, Dis Borclar, Cumhuriyet
Donemi Turkiye Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, Iletisim
Yayinlari), p. 470.
[37] Moore Lyndon,
‘Regime change and debt default: the case of Russia, Austro-Hungary, and the
Ottoman empire following World War One’, Explorations
in Economic History, 42 (2005) p. 251
[38] Asaf Savas Akat,
Dis Borclar, Cumhuriyet Donemi Turkiye Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, Iletisim Yayinlari, 1983), p. 470.
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